https://www.kicksecure.com/wiki/Dev/sdwdate#chrony_as_a_replacement_for_sclockadj

Is this still reuqired since we also have early sysctl loading during initramfs?

Funding available. Anyone up to implement this?

No longer using this extension. Alternatives here:
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Offline_Documentation

No mailing list at the moment. Deprecating this issue tracker. Can be re-considered in the future.

rsync over TLS or even onion is implemented for a long time already and documented here:
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Hosting_a_Mirror

This was done a long time ago.

Not possible because of above issue.

https://forums.whonix.org/t/disk-usb-automount-in-kicksecure/8728/31

Cannot reproduce anymore in Whonix for VirtualBox.

In T509#20232, @ak88 wrote:

Any updates on this?

Any updates on this?

migrated to https://forums.whonix.org/t/mediawiki-css-fixes/11874

migrated to https://forums.whonix.org/t/mediawiki-css-fixes/11874

In T993#20220, @Patrick wrote:

I don't see what else can be done here. This statement is limited to only what was said in this ticket.

I don't see what else can be done here. This statement is limited to only what was said in this ticket.

Btw this issue tracker is being phased out:
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Reporting_Bugs#Issue_Tracker

I am not sure sdwdate-gui would be a strong enough notification if networking was actually blocked if sdwdate did not succeed yet.

This was implemented. Now using python3 requests.

No longer required. Was implemented through te_pe_tb_check enhancements.

https://gitlab.com/whonix/qubes-whonix/-/commit/53ff72ab6ce59cb2c98401fd701ae782ca100e37

I've found why sudo asked for password, it wasn't related to security-misc script mentioned earlier. And should be fixed in newer qubes-core-agent package.

In T1001#20201, @Patrick wrote:

/usr/lib/qubes-whonix/init/torified-updates-proxy-check is currently only started by /lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-torified-updates-proxy-check.service.

Wondering why this is happening. When root uses sudo, pam shouldn't even be involved.

/usr/lib/qubes-whonix/init/torified-updates-proxy-check is currently only started by /lib/systemd/system/qubes-whonix-torified-updates-proxy-check.service.

documented here:
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Whonixcheck_Hardening#Prevent_Downloading_Whonix_.E2.84.A2_News_and_Whonix_.E2.84.A2_User_Census_Counting

Looks all good and quite in Whonix 15.0.1.5.1.

We don't use this tracker for new feature requests anymore either as per:
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Reporting_Bugs

It is important to understand, that systemD is actually much more than simply an init system:

Shipping kloak in Whonix stable for a few releases already.

After running a bunch of tcp ping tests, the conclusion is this attack
is not really effective against TCP like ICMP. The latency is much lower
for TCP pings and though it slightly decreases with cpu stress it is not
consistent. Reloading pages in TBB with cpu stress
on/off does not impact latency readings while doing so with tc
attached has massive latency foot prints - implying it will ironically make such attacks much easier in addition to degrading performance.

Cyrus recommends adding delays per packet to disrupt inter-packet patterns that remain. The command can be fine tuned as such:

The good news is I think I've figured out the equivalent tc-netem command looking the slot parameter in the manual:

Building on anything other than Debian buster is unsupported.

553 Unable to store creds for

Did you set ClientOnionAuthDir in torrc (to a directory with "private
enough" permissions)?

Rusty

A few more questions:

Btw, Devuan is almost the same Debian with systemD removed from it.
Devuan even uses the same Debian binary repository with a few substitutions/replacements by its own Devuan packages just to eliminate nasty systemD.

In T998#20144, @sanyo wrote:

May I know, what do you think about Whonix vs OpenBSD in terms of security for a headless server without any GUI?

May I know, what do you think about Whonix vs OpenBSD in terms of security for a headless server without any GUI?

I guess it shall not be any harder to port Whonix to Devuan than porting it to original Debian.

There's no manual.

Thanks for the report.

More useful information from my tests: When I setup obfs4 using the Anon-Connection-Wizard the previous obfs4 that I used worked fine. Unfortunately I can't setup snowflake from it.

Don't know if this is indicative of anything but after I add -log snowflake-client.log -log-to-state-dir at the end of the ClientTransportPlugin snowflake line in /usr/local/etc/torrc.d/50_user.conf I obtain the following error:

Tor Browser onion authentication prompt:
https://blog.torproject.org/sites/default/files/inline-images/onion-auth%402x.png

What Tor related apps are broken without support for this?

Alternative to github.com now needed.

Maybe this is bound per connection similar to ephemeral Tor onion services? In that case, other VMs couldn't re-use it.

https://github.com/adrelanos/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/commit/97ff68a6c49ecef3e79ab10e1a930a4f5e13198d#commitcomment-39671373

onion_client_auth_add Flags=Permanent fails with 553 Unable to store creds for

In T996#20096, @rustybird wrote:

https://github.com/adrelanos/anon-gw-anonymizer-config/commit/97ff68a6c49ecef3e79ab10e1a930a4f5e13198d#commitcomment-39671373

https://forums.whonix.org/t/whonix-moving-from-github-to-gitlab/9676

Maybe this is bound per connection similar to ephemeral Tor onion services?

Update Tor to 0.4.3.5

Ticket above closed and convo moved to tails-dev.